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The aim of this thesis is to build a virtual penetration testing environment in order to
test cyber security of IoT devices and provide material for teaching penetration testing
in cyber security courses at the University of Turku. This thesis utilises the VMWare
ESXI server rented by the University of Turku and also those Linux operating systems
which have open-source code licences. In addition, this study exploits the Windows XP
licence, held by the University of Turku, as the target machine in the attack. The IoT
devices in this study have been coded from scratch by author of this thesis, and they work
automatically when the virtual machine, where the device is installed, is switched on.
The virtual laboratory is built so that it is possible to install new devices if required. The
beginning of the thesis is as comprehensive as possible so that the reader can comprehend
the idea of cyber security in IoT devices and smart home system easily. This thesis
covers the most common data transfer methods, their history, and the strength of their
cyber security. In addition, the thesis covers the most used attack types and tools for
implementing these attacks, and also example cases where these particular attacks have
been used.
Thesis also presents an architecture model for a smart home in order for the reader to
get a better view of the different possibilities of a smart home. Possible risk factors
concerning cyber security are also considered with each device. This thesis also touches
upon the role of smart cities and industry in the IoT market. The main focus is, however,
on IoT devices used in smart home architecture and on researching their cyber security.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The number of Internet of Things (IoT) devices has grown exponentially in the last decade. Orig-
inally these devices became increasingly popular in industry, but later they have been manufac-
tured for private use and for the needs of smart cities as well. Devices targeted for the industry
are mainly different types of measuring sensors and minicomputers needed for transmitting their
data. Devices targeted for smart cities use the same sensor techniques that are used in the in-
dustry, however, there are some additions: street lighting control devices, measuring techniques
for smart parking, devices for measuring cleanliness of swimming water, and different types of
collectors for targeted marketing. The needs of smart homes slightly deviate from these two pre-
viously mentioned, as the environment which is measured is much smaller and it is desirable that
the controlling environment is easy and quick and can be directed to the person living there.
Together with the increasing number of IoT devices in the society, a question of their security
is raised. When installing devices in public sector buildings, such as hospitals and schools, it is
of utmost importance to consider privacy and safety of those who use the building. These people
might not have the opportunity to affect the functioning of the devices, thus, they need to be able
to trust that the devices are safe. When installing IoT devices in private homes, yet new aspects of
safety must be taken into consideration. The information that might be recorded on the devices in
private homes must be kept safe, and also data transfer to the network outside the apartment has
to be limited as carefully as possible. The user needs to be able to do this limiting him- or herself,
and it cannot be predefined by the device manufacturer.
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In this thesis, the safety of IoT devices is examined and a virtual testing environment is built
for testing of cyber security in these devices. The thesis touches upon devices used in industry and
smart cities, but the main focus is on the smart home IoT architecture in the private sector. The
purpose of this virtual penetration testing environment is to model the IoT device environment
of private homes and examine how the safety of the devices installed in this environment can be
tested. The aim of this thesis is to examine whether IoT devices can be tested reliably in a virtual
environment, or do they require a physical network environment for reliable testing. Another aim
of this thesis is to build a closed practice environment for penetration testing of IoT devices in the
cyber security education at the university of Turku.
Chapter 2 explains what is an IoT device and their most common uses and operating principles.
After this, the history of IoT devices is covered briefly. The history begins with the introduction
of the term IoT in 1999 and from where the term came [2]. In addition, its development to this
day is examined, ending up in future prospects in 2020 [7]. After covering history, the use of
IoT devices in smart homes, smart cities and in industry is explored. Section 2.2 examines the
IoT environment in general and the architecture built around it in a smart home. Later, chapter
5 delves more deeply into this environment. Section 2.3 covers IoT devices in a smart city on a
more general level and section 2.4 examines their functions in the industry.
Chapter 3 examines network techniques used in IoT devices. The network techniques chosen
for this study were the most common techniques in the sector of IoT devices at the time this study
was made. Section 3.1 focuses on a wire connection, Ethernet, examining its history and safety.
Section 3.2 is focused on WLAN standards and their safety, whereas section 3.3 examines the
standards of Bluetooth and Bluetooth low energy. The most common techniques of LPWAN tech-
niques used in IoT devices are dealt with in section 3.4. These include, for example, Narrowband
IoT, LoRaWAN and SigFox.
In chapter 4, the safety of IoT devices is considered, along with attack types targeted at them
and tools with which these attacks can be implemented. There is also an example case of each
attack type, explaining where that particular attack was used and how this could have been pre-
vented by improving safety in the devices. The latter part of chapter 4 presents attacking tools and
what kind of attacking techniques it is possible to produce with these tools.
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Chapter 5 delves into the architecture of a smart home. When the goal is to change the home
into a smart home, many things need to be taken into consideration in the planning stage. This
chapter explores various devices, what are the minimum requirements for a functioning smart
home, and other generally used devices and their safety in a smart home.
Chapter 6 presents the virtual penetration testing laboratory built in this thesis and introduces
the softwares needed for building this laboratory. In addition, information on the first capture the
flag (CTF) exercises is given, and it is intended that these are used in cyber security courses in the
future.
Chapter 2
Internet of Things
The term Internet of Things (IoT) means devices that are connected to the Internet [1]. For exam-
ple, new smart refrigerators, which can connect to the Internet, are IoT devices. The user is able
to program the refrigerator so that it orders groceries from the shop: the order is forwarded via
Internet to the shop, which then sends the products to the customer using a delivery service. The
number of IoT devices in the society has grown and will continue to grow steadily as the economic
situation of people improve and they have more free time. Increased free time means that people
also want more conveniences to help their everyday life. The benefits of these smart devices in the
society and its functions are enormous and for this reason the number of start-up companies in the
field of IoT devices is increasingly growing.
As the number of IoT devices increases, their information security must also be taken into con-
sideration. Many devices are made using the plug in principle and hence they can be plugged into
the network straight from the package. Usually these devices have a factory-configured password,
which can be simple, for example “1234”, or long and complicated. These passwords are usually
found from the product’s packaging and people take them from there. If the factory-configured
password is too weak, there should be directions for changing the password. However, this is
not always the case. Then the user who buys and installs the product can cause a threat in the
information security of the whole system into which the device is plugged in.
IoT devices can be plugged into personal environments such as smart homes, cars, cottages,
and boats. Alternatively, the devices can be plugged into a larger environment, for example into
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a whole network of a city. IoT devices are pioneering in the industry; several production lines
have been automated with the help of IoT devices. IoT devices can be used to monitor access
control, parking, and other simple production line functions. This chapter deals with the history
of IoT, followed by utilising IoT devices in smart home systems, planning of smart cities, and in
the industry.
2.1 Brief history of IoT
Although IoT devices have become widespread very quickly and their use has diversified, for
a number of sectors the history of the Internet of Things is still very short. The term Internet of
Things was first used by Kevin Ashton in 1999 in a title of his presentation [2]. This title was meant
to impress the senior partners of his organization by becoming through as a term aimed for the
future and at the same time being mysterious. The presentation was about an identification method
using RFID technology [2]. Internet of Things is, however, much older than the term used to define
it, and its beginnings take place much further in history. It is very hard to define the exact time
when the technology, nowadays called as the Internet of Things, was created. But when thinking
of devices which function independently and are connected to each other via internet, these kinds
of devices are already found in the 1970s [3]. The first official IoT device was developed by John
Romkey: he introduced it in 1990 in the INTERCOP conference [4]. The device was a toaster
which was possible to switch on and off via internet. The device was plugged into the internet
using TCP/IP protocol suite.
In 2005 a new step was taken in IoT technology. The International Telecommunication Union
(ITU) published a report which dealt with the future of Internet and devices which are plugged into
the internet. “from anytime, any place connectivity for anyone, we will now have connectivity for
anything” ITU report [5]. In the same year, Rafi Haladjian and Olivier Mével introduced a robotic
rabbit which was able to do alerts of the state of stock market and report the newest headlines
to users using a WiFi connection [4]. According to the Cisco Internet Business Solutions Group
(IBSG), IoT was created between the years 2008-2009 [4]. At that time, according to their report,
there were more devices plugged into the internet than there were users. To be more exact, there
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were 1.84 devices plugged into the internet per one person, according to them [4].
The new version of Internet Protocol, called IPv6, was published in December 1998 [6], after
which the universe of address locations grew so enormously that it was possible to plug in all
devices in the internet and still there would have been addresses left. After this, Cisco, IBM
and Ericsson began to develop education and marketing systems for these devices. In addition,
Arduino began developing new platforms suitable for IoT devices together with other platform
developers. In a briefing published in 2013, there was an estimation that IoT device market would
expand to a value of 8.9 billion by the year 2020 [7].
2.2 Smart home
When people think about smart homes, they immediately think about science fiction movies sit-
uated in the future, where a home is functioning like a robot and is capable of conforming to all
of the tenant’s wishes and can also function as an interlocutor with the tenant when he or she is
at home. These movies can cause people to fear that they lose their privacy; they start to think
whether they trust this technology and will their personal and sensitive information leak outside
home without their knowing. People equally fear the kind of world depicted by futuristic movies.
For example, in the film ”Terminator”, artificial intelligence called ”Skynet” invades mankind.
Fearing these kinds of incidents is never unjustified, but considering the technology nowadays, a
smart home with its units is ultimately a computer software and it can easily be switched off.
In reality, when the number of IoT devices grow, these devices functioning in the internet can
be harnessed to function better in a contiguous network environment [8]. People do not need to
conform to the increase in amenities provided by smart phones, but these same properties can be
used to govern lighting or heating systems in homes. It is possible to install an electronic lock to
the front door, programmed in a way that when somebody who uses the apartment has forgotten
their key, the door can be opened remotely; with a software installed in the phone. If the tenant
wants to sleep in a cooler room, but still wants the room to be warm when he or she wakes up, it
is possible to adjust the temperature automatically according to certain times of day.
It can be challenging to build a smart home without any technical knowledge. However, nowa-
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days there are more and more companies that offer a so-called turnkey solution; a service where
the tenant can get these kinds of services adjusted to the tenants needs. The home is normally
governed by a central computer, which usually is an IoT device equipped with a touch pad (see
figure 2.1).
Figure 2.1: The control panel of IoT devices in a smart home system
Systems installed at home, for example sockets, thermoregulators, surveillance camera sys-
tems, electronic locks and other internet-connectable sensors, in addition to IoT devices, are
plugged into the internet via a central control unit and programmed according to users wishes.
Furthermore, a smart phone can be plugged into the control unit with a separate application to
make it easier for the user to govern devices remotely.
After the devices have been installed and the user is instructed to use them, the biggest chal-
lenge is security. As was already mentioned in the beginning of this section, the user usually has a
realistic fear that devices might leak sensitive information outside home. Therefore, is it possible
that some unrelated instance could take control over the devices in somebody’s home and cause
harmful or even dangerous activity with these devices? These questions and their answers are the
subject of the fifth chapter of this thesis, where building of a smart home system is examined with
an eye especially on information security. In the next section it is examined how IoT devices have
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enabled the building of entire smart cities.
2.3 Smart cities
A smart city is a city where normal services of a city, for example public transport, schools,
libraries, hospitals, power stations, authorities’ services, water, plumbing and electricity supply
are all combined into a single system operating with electronic devices and sensors [9]. These
devices and sensors are meant to serve the inhabitants of the city and improve their quality of life
by making services better available and improve their use.
When these kinds of systems are planned to be built in a city, the first thing that should be
thought of, is that services are supposed to improve citizens’ quality of life and security. However,
as surveillance increases, citizens probably cannot help but think that a “big brother” is watch-
ing them. Disproving this assumption should be the first priority when making plans. The best
ways to spread knowledge of smart cities, is to make the gathered data open and give the citizens
themselves a chance to participate in developing systems in the city together with the authorities
[10].
Already there are several smart city systems operating in the world and these have proved to
be useful in the operation systems of cities. For example, a Danish research with a published guide
”Think Denmark” [11] dealt in detail with different stages of how to plan a smart city and how it
will improve the lives of citizens (see figure 2.2).
According to the Danish framework, the most important thing in designing a smart city is to
change “smart vision to a smart society”. The planning begins by changing all the systems in the
city to a digital form. This means planning and developing sensors, data gathering services and
systems for their management. Infrastructure dealing with different sectors of the city, for example
variables targeted at energy production, waste management, traffic, and air quality, must be built
on top of the basic systems [11]. Air quality, temperature and efficiency of these equipment can
be affected by installing sensors to gather data from the air quality, for example from schools,
nurseries, hospitals and other public buildings. The data from these sensors can be gathered to
a unitary system, from which subsystems can be governed and information can be distributed to
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Figure 2.2: A framework for smart cities [11]
inhabitants. Also, if a weakening in the quality of air is detected, it is easy to attend to this problem
early on, in order to avoid exposures. Furthermore, sensors can be used to monitor temperature in
buildings and when they are not in use, the temperature can be lowered, which brings savings in
heating costs.
Emptying of garbage bins can be organized more efficiently in big cities with the help of
sensors installed in waste management systems [12]. When bins are emptied regularly, the number
of vermin in the city is easier to control. In addition, consumption of gasoline can be optimized
as the drivers can follow filling of the garbage bins in real time using an application. Sensors can
be installed to monitor traffic and to decrease traffic jams [13]. Also, inhabitants can be offered
services with which they can easily follow rush hour times using their own mobile application and
therefore avoid rush hour traffic. Sensor systems can be installed to the city’s own car parks, which
would give real time information to the citizens about free parking spaces, as it would be helpful
to have this information already before entering the city. If parking spaces were easier to find,
it would bring customers to the services more quickly and it would also reduce pollution caused
by fumes in the city’s air. By installing a wireless network and a monitoring system in vehicles
of public transport, citizens get better information about the real time location of busses, trains,
trams, and underground trains, making their use more easily optimized for the citizens.
However, the most important aspect in planning a smart city is its safety [14]. Devices, which
are installed to gather data, can be easily damaged physically and their operation can be disturbed
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electrically. When installing sensors, it must be taken into consideration that it is possible to pro-
tect them from natural forces, but also from vandalism. Usually the sensors do not send sensitive
data, but if, for example, a signal sent by a parking system is disturbed, it can cause problems for
the citizens in finding a parking space. This problem can also become bigger if a citizen loses his
or her trust in the system. From a safety point of view, the damage can be quite large if somebody
messes up air conditioning systems, therefore causing economic losses in the form of energy con-
sumption, and in the worst-case scenario permanent damage to the building. Disturbing systems
in hospitals or rest homes can cause serious health problems. Thus, when connecting into the
systems of a smart city, it should be carefully considered which equipment are included in the sys-
tem. These safety issues and related questions are examined in detail in chapter 4. The following
section considers IoT systems used in the industry.
2.4 IoT in industry
Among the major users of IoT devices are various industries [15]. Sensors in various machinery
of industrial plants is already the norm. Thus, when they are connected to the Internet, also
the industry moves into the digital era and begins to use IoT devices. With these sensors the
reliability of maintenance can be improved and the need for repairs can also be predicted better.
If a device with an installed sensor has a part which is about to break, the device sends this
information directly to the central computer. The maintenance team gets the information and can
begin preparing its repair even before a problem occurs.
When sensors are installed to production lines, information can be transferred directly from
there to controlling units, which improves optimization of production [15]. These systems require
a large amount of processing power, data transfer, and saving space. At this stage cloud services
are also involved. Cloud services enable to break away from physical machine halls which re-
quire large spaces in the industrial plants and require their own maintenance team. New types of
problems occur when factories begin to use IoT systems. An example of these kinds of problems
is network overloading. In the planning stage of the factory’s systems, one must indeed consider
which information is relevant to transfer from the production line to be calculated in a cloud ser-
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Figure 2.3: Transferring information from the production line to be calculated in the cloud
service
vice. It is useful to leave part of the information for the devices to calculate and only transfer the
final, already processed data to the cloud service. This way the amount of data overloading the
network could be reduced, at least to some extent. When moving to using IoT devices, one must
also consider the changing conditions of information security. Data of the devices is usually sent
making use of wireless networks, for example WiFi. If the device sends sensitive data from the
perspective of the factory’s production, the factory must ensure that this information does not leak
into the wrong hands. Furthermore, a denial of service (DoS) attack is possible when using wire-
less network technology between devices and the controlling unit. This type of attack can cause a
major economic setback for the factory, or even casualties [15].
Chapter 4 examines problems related to information security in IoT devices used in industry
more carefully. However, the main goal of this study is the planning of a smart home and pene-
tration testing of its IoT device network in a virtual environment, which is why IoT devices in the
industry is only covered superficially. IoT network technologies are examined in the next chapter,
where the most common network technologies used in IoT devices are explore.
Chapter 3
IoT network technologies
This chapter examines the most common network technologies IoT devices are using, beginning
with a wired technology called Ethernet [16]. Wired technologies are, in general, more reliable
than wireless, however, it is usually more cost-efficient to install wireless devices. Moreover,
wireless devices are also easier to change and replace. In relation to wireless networks, the first
one presented here is a technology called wireless local area network (WLAN) [17], which is
still the most common wireless technology in use regarding the IoT device market. The second
wireless technology examined in this chapter is Bluetooth, which is the most popular technology
in headphones and smartwatches. LPWAN, which is becoming increasingly popular in the IoT
device market, is presented fourth in this chapter. This section covers those low-power wide-area
network (LPWAN) technologies which are the most utilized, for example NB-IoT, LoRaWAN and
SigFox. Each of these technologies are briefly introduced; how they have been developed and
what kind of qualities they possess in relation to IoT devices. Furthermore, it is also examined
whether their information security is on a level where it is considered to be.
3.1 Ethernet
Ethernet, or more formally known IEEE 802.3, is a standardised data transfer technology and
nowadays the most popular computer local area network. The first standard of this technology
was publicly introduced in 1983. Competing standards were Token Ring, FDDI (Fiber Distributed
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Data Interface) and ARCNET (Attached Resource Computer NETwork).
3.1.1 History of Ethernet
The first stages of Ethernet can be traced to a research centre in Palo Alto, where it was developed
for the use of Xerox Alto computer in 1973 [18]. The network, which nowadays has a data transfer
speed of over 10 Gb/s, then had a data transfer speed of only 2,94 Mb/s. The development of this
network proceeded quickly and already in 1995, the data transfer speed was 100 Mb/s. At the
time, different versions of the network were developed under the name Fast Ethernet. The version
called 100baseTX remains in use today [19].
The Fast Ethernet technology was standardised by the IEEE. The problem was that when data
transfer became faster, the length of a single cable was reduced 100 metres from 2,5 kilometres.
With the Fast ethernet, the data transfer speed of network interface cards in home computers was
increased from 10 Mb/s to 100 Mb/s [19].
3.1.2 Security of Ethernet
The Ethernet technology is very reliable when the goal is to connect IoT devices to the same
network. The advantages of this technology are that it is free to use, it does not need a separate
license, it is fast, and a distance of over 100 meters can be reached with only one cable. In addition,
when considering the safety of Ethernet, it is much harder to eavesdrop Ethernet than a wireless
connection. The Ethernet can be used in local area networks (LAN), metropolitan area networks
(MAN), and wide area networks (WAN), depending on the network architecture and network area
size [20]. Disadvantages are that Ethernet always requires cabling and large connectors.
Ethernet is useful at least in home and office environments. When devices are connected to
each other with cables, it is considerably harder for the attacker to listen to the data traffic. In this
case the attacker needs to connect his or her own computer to the same internal network with a
physical connection or to penetrate a firewall. In wireless communication systems, the attacker can
listen data traffic by simply capturing the wireless signal. By connecting low energy IoT devices
with an Ethernet cable, the same cable can be used for network traffic and for taking the energy
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Figure 3.1: Power over Ethernet adapter (PoE)
for the use of the device. For this purpose, specific PoE (Power over Ethernet) devices have been
developed (see figure 3.1) [21].
3.2 Wireless local area network
Wireless local area network (WLAN) is a wireless data transfer technology which is based on the
IEEE 802.11 standard [22, p. vii]. It is more commonly known by its commercial name WiFi.
When a household is connected to this network, a modem is the first device to be installed. The
modem can also include a wireless router with which a wireless local area network (WLAN) can
be created. If the modem does not include such technology, a separate wireless router can be
connected to it, thus creating a WLAN.
A wireless network is usually the easiest way to connect devices such as laptops and smart
phones to the internet. Nowadays laptops and smartphones have integrated wireless adapters, and
it is therefore easier to make a connection to the router in the household. Desktop computers are
usually connected to the router with an Ethernet cable, but if this is not possible for some reason,
there is a separate wireless adapter working with USB or wireless adapters which can be installed
directly to the desktop computer’s PCI channel (see figure 3.2). With these adapters, it is possible
to connect this device to a WLAN. When wireless technology is used to connect devices to the
network, extra wiring in an apartment is avoided and the connected devices can also be moved
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Figure 3.2: TP-LINK wireless USB adapter
within the network’s range without losing their network connection.
The usability of the technology is also one reason for this technology being nowadays the
most common technology for data transfer, for sensors to report temperature in homes, and for
adjusting brightness in lighting. With a wireless technology the information from sensors can be
sent directly to the main device at home, from where the user can control their functions. If the
main device is connected to the heating system and electrical distribution centre in the apartment,
the information from these sensors can easily be used for adjusting the temperature and lighting
in the apartment. Furthermore, these functions can be automatized.
3.2.1 WLAN standards and security
In September 1999, the IEEE published amendments 802.11a and 802.11b, which were improve-
ments to the original standard 802.11, published in 1997 [22, pp. 7-8]. The original standard
802.11 works in the 2,4 GHz frequency band and it has a maximum transmission speed of 1 Mbit/s
or 2 Mbit/s, depending on the modulation used. The new version 802.11b is working in the same
frequency band 2,4 GHz, but transmission speed has been increased to 5,5 Mbit/s or 11 Mbit/s.
The next amendments 802.11a used the 5,5 GHz channel and the transmission speed was increased
to 54 Mbit/s. The cost of usability of wireless technology is also one reason why the amendments
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802.11a 802.11b 802.11g 802.11n 802.11ac
802.11
Chronological order
Figure 3.3: 802.11 family amendments from the oldest to the newest
802.11a did not become the main WLAN technology. When the frequency band moved from 2,4
GHz to 5,5 GHz, the network range decreased [22, pp. 7-8]. When amendments 802.11b were
published, the IEEE developed a new encryption security algorithm called Wired Equivalent Pri-
vacy (WEP) [23, pp. 216-218]. The main idea of this new encryption algorithm was to encrypt the
transmission between a wireless device and the router so that it could not be eavesdropped. WEP
is based on the RC4 encryption algorithm which was included in RSA Security [23, pp. 216-218].
The WEP encryption technology is already an outdated encryption technology and it is very easy
to break with basic penetration testing tools. The IEEE published a new amendment 802.11g in
summer 2003 [22, pp. 7-8]. 802.11g has the same transmission speed of 54 Mbit/s as standard
802.11a, but this speed is available in the 2,4 GHz frequency band. When 802.11g was published
it replaced 802.11b in the market [22, pp. 7-8]. 802.11g was also back compatible with 802.11b
and it had a lower manufacturing cost than 802.11a. In the same year that the 802.11g amendment
was published, the IEEE also developed a new encryption technology. This new encryption tech-
nology was needed because there were already so many vulnerabilities in the WEP encryption that
it was not secure anymore. The new encryption technology called Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA)
used the Temporal Key Integrity Protocol (TKIP) to increase security [23, pp. 219-220]. This new
encryption technology used the same RC4 encryption algorithm than WEP, but with TKIP, and the
size of encryption keys could be increased from 64-bit to 128-bit [24, pp. 55-57]. A year later,
in 2004, the IEEE published amendments 802.11i which included a new WiFi Protected Access
II (WPA2) was published at the same time [22, pp. 7-8]. The new encryption algorithm called
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WPA2 included support for Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) which replaced the old RC4
encryption algorithm. In October 2009, the IEEE published a new 802.11n which supported trans-
mission speed up to 600 Mbit/s [22, pp. 7-8]. When the IEEE published this new amendment,
they had to decrease the transmission speed back to 54 Mbit/s because old devices did not support
the new speed. The new amendments 802.11n is more commonly known as WiFi 4. The next new
amendment that the IEEE published in 2013 was 802.11ac, more commonly known as WiFi 5 [22,
p. 3]. In WIFI 5, the technology was improved, making the maximum transmission speed over 1
Gbt/s. In 2019, the IEEE published a new amendment 802.11ax, more commonly known as WiFi
6 [22, pp. 33]. WiFi 6 included an improved encryption algorithm WPA3, but it will take some
time for it to become the main encryption technology in the market.
3.3 Bluetooth and BLE
Bluetooth (BT) is the most used technology between two devices which are in short range [25, p.
3]. Bluetooth is used, for example, between a smart phone and wireless speakers. BT was created
to replace the old infrared technology. The range in this old technology was almost the same than
in the new BT technology, but the problem in that technology was the connection. When two
devices using infrared technology try to connect and keep the connection up, these devices have
to stay in a line-of-sight the whole time. Bluetooth uses radio frequency (RF) and therefore does
not need line-of-sight. Bluetooh Low Energy (BLE) is a lightened version of the original BT. BLE
is very useful if the IoT devices are using low energy and the data amounts sent by these devices
are small. These kinds of devices include, for example, remote controllers and heart rate monitors
[26, p. 3]. The founder of BT was the Swedish mobile phone manufacturer Ericsson. Ericsson
created the BT technology together with the BT founder group in 1998 [25, p. 3]. Ericson, Nokia,
IBM, Intel and Toshiba belong to the Special Interest Group (SIG) and the primary goal of this
group was to create a new standard de facto. The name Bluetooth comes from the Viking king
Harald Bluetooth, who managed to unite several families under one kingdom. The SIG had the
same idea when they wanted to unite several communication protocols under one standard. The
first device that utilized BT technology were mobile phone speakers developed in 1999. Such a
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device won the prize for ”Best of Show Technology Award” in the COMDEX competition which
was organized also in 1999 [27]. After the new BT technology became more common, the first
mobile phones which utilized BT technology also began coming to the market in 2001 [27].
BT works with a master-slave principle. One of the devices is the host, which will share the
network to the public, and the other device, which is the slave, tries to connect to this shared
network. A BT device can share a piconet (see figure 3.5), and eight devices can be in the same
piconet at the same time. In this case, one device must be the master and the seven others will be
slaves. A device can be a master only in one piconet at the same time, and if the device is a slave,
it can only communicate with one master at a time [25, pp. 8-11].
Figure 3.4: Different kinds of piconets [25, p. 9]
The first thing when trying to connect BT devices is to turn on the BT signal. A BT device
sends an inquiry message to the network and repeats it for a couple of minutes. When another
BT device turns on the BT and starts scanning the environment, the unconnected device enter in
the inquiry scan state which means that the device wants to be discovered and these devices can
find each other. Both devices are supposed to be in the same area when messages are sent. If the
devices already know each other, this stage can be bypassed. In this case, the devices find each
CHAPTER 3. IOT NETWORK TECHNOLOGIES 19
other when the signal is turned on.
Figure 3.5: An example of a Bluetooth connection establishment[28]
After two BT devices have found each other in the network, the Link Manager Protocol (LMP)
begins creating a connection between them (see figure 3.6). First, the master device sends an LMP
connection request message to the slave device, which, in turn, accepts the connection request.
Next, the master device sends an authentication request to the slave device and the slave device
accepts it. If the authentication is successful, the master device sends an encryption request to the
slave device which the slave device then accepts. Now the encryption can start, and the master-
slave connection has been made.
Several versions of BT have been developed throughout the years. The BT version 5.0, pub-
lished in 2016, is the newest version of BT technology [29]. The earlier version BT 4.0 was
CHAPTER 3. IOT NETWORK TECHNOLOGIES 20
published in 2010 and it is the first version that includes BLE technology [30, p. 26]. BLE is
the most used BT technology in the IoT sector, because of low energy consumption. Short signal
range is a problem in BLE technology, but the new version 5.0 has fixed this problem with an
almost four times longer signal range [29]. The BT version 4.2 is still the most used version of
BT technology because the old devices do not have the technology with which to use the new BT
version 5.0. The BT versions 4.1 and 4.2 have also updated the BT security protocol and firmware
[30, p. 27]. BT uses frequency band 2,4 GHz, which is the same frequency band that WiFi tech-
nology uses. If there is a BT speaker and a strong WiFi adapter in the same space, there might be
some interference in connection.
The transmission speed of BT technology can be almost 3 Mbit/s. The BT version 3.0 has new
technology in which to add a WLAN connection, increasing the transmission speed to 24 Mbit/s.
BT technology is divided to three different classes [31]. Class 1 has an ability to send a signal
with a signal strength of over 20 dBm and the signal range can be over 100 metres. Common
devices in this class are laptop computers and BT dongles. However, the BT class 1 can operate
with classes 2 and 3, but the signal range will be shorter when mixing classes. The signal range
of class 2 is under 10 metres. Class 3 is a low energy class and the signal range is under 1 metre.
The technology of class 3 is normally used in smart watches and heart rate monitors.
3.4 Low-Power Wide-Area network
Low-Power Wide-Area network (LPWAN) refers to long-range wireless communication technol-
ogy. These technologies have low energy consumption and they transfer a trace amount of data
with to long range. These technologies can be used to build a network which covers a large area
and transfers only some bits. LPWAN is used, for example, in smart parking systems or tempera-
ture surveillance systems in the industry.
3.4.1 Narrowband IoT
Narrowband IoT (NB-IoT) is a wireless communication technology based on 3GPP standard of
LPWAN solutions [32, pp. 16-17]. It is a 4G communication technology designed together by
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Nokia, Ericsson, Huawei and Intel in 2016. NB-IoT can utilize the same 4G network as other
mobile devices. The newest version of NB-IoT technology was published in 2018.
The data transfer speed of NB-IoT technology is under 250 kbit/s and normally it is used in
sensors. However, the signal strength of NB-IoT is over 20 dBm and it can easily penetrate walls
and doors. Another advantage compared to WiFi is low energy consumption; an NB-IoT device
can operate over ten years with two AA batteries [33]. The ability to use normal 4G commu-
nication network gives an advantage to NB-IoT against other LPWAN technologies [33]. With
NB-IoT, several hundred of devices can be connected in the same network at the same time. That
is why it is very popular in smart parking systems. When an NB-IoT base station is installed in the
right place, one base station can cover the whole parking area. In addition, garbage management
is using NB-IoT technology to save gasoline costs and decrease pest problems in cities.
3.4.2 LoRaWAN
Low-Range Wide-Area-Network (LoRaWAN) is another LPWAN communication technology that
is used in wireless communication in IoT devices [32, pp. 17]. The difference between NB-IoT
and LoRaWAN is that LoRaWAN does not have to use public network to communicate. When
using the LoRaWAN technology, there is a communication terminal which creates its own network
signal. LoRaWAN has three different classes of communication terminals; Class-A, Class-B and
Class-C [34].
The class-A communication terminal works with bidirectional communication technology,
which is based on ALOHA type communication protocol [35]. The devices in this class have the
lowest power consumptions compared to the other two classes, and it answers to the server only
when asked.
The class-B communication terminal also has bidirectional communication technology. How-
ever, devices in this class can also create their own answering frame. This answering frame is
time synchronized and the server is capable to know when this frame is open in a device. This
technology needs slightly more power than the class-A technology, but it is still a low energy
device.
The class-C communication terminal uses more power than the other two classes because it is
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awake the whole time. Only when a device in this class sends a message to the server, it cannot
listen to the traffic in the other direction. When a device in class-C starts sending a message to the
server, it will close the answering frame and open it again after the message is sent.
LoRaWAN devices are extremely energy-effective and still able to send messages over long
ranges [35]. Because of their energy efficiency, the amount of data sent by LoRaWAN devices is
typically relatively small. The data transfer speed of LoRaWAN devices is limited to 50 Kbit/s
and the amount of data to be sent is usually some tens of kilobits at one time. Data transfer of this
size is, however, sufficient enough for sensors.
Figure 3.6: The basic structure of a LoRaWAN network
As can be seen in Figure 3.7, the basic structure of LoRaWAN is very simple. The sensors
send data to the gateway, from where the data is transferred to the wired network. There are servers
in the network which gather and process the data. Information can be sent from the server to the
application server or it can be received directly from the application server. The application server
in question can be installed to a computer or to a mobile phone.
LoRaWAN is a very simple and safe solution that can be used, for example, in air concentra-
tion measurement, smart parking, garbage surveillance, or monitoring fire-sensitive sites. As the
sensors themselves do not work directly in the Internet network, devices based on the same tech-
nology have to be used in attacking against them. However, when the information is transferred
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from the gateway to the Network server, normal attacks against the IP protocol have to be taken
into consideration as well.
3.4.3 SigFox
SigFox is the third most common information transfer protocol working with LPWAN technology
[32, pp. 17]. Originally, it competed with the LoRaWAN protocol, but when NB-IoT came to
the market, it has lost its position to some extent [36]. It works with the same radiotechnology as
NB-IoT and LoRaWAN but is under a paid licence. SigFox has, however, been on the market since
2009, for the longest of these three technologies. SigFox communication terminals are cheaper
than the communication terminals of the other two, but they only work in their own network,
making the SigFox protocol much more limited.
SigFox protocol will not be discussed in more detail in this thesis, as its use in smart homes
is not as common as the use of LoRaWAN and NB-IoT. LoRaWAN and NB-IoT technologies are
also more flexible when they are combined together. It can be concluded that SigFox is a useful
technology, which is becoming more common also in the IoT market, but at the moment it is still
simpler to operate in a smart home without it.
Chapter 4
The current state of IoT cyber security
In the previous chapters it was discussed what is a smart home and a smart city and how IoT is
related to the industry sector. Different data transfer technologies for this environment were also
discussed. In this chapter, the first section focuses on the different devices that the smart house en-
vironment can include, and examines the IoT data traffic threats, which may arise when designing
these environments. When designing a smart house environment, there should be different systems
and their subsystems, and all these systems must work together. The various subsystems contain
different technologies; thus, the attackers have also several different technologies with which to
brake inside the environment. The second section focuses on the current state of IoT security
and on different technologies how an attack against these devices works and which programs the
attacker possible uses.
4.1 Devices in smart home system
The first things that come to mind when talking about smart houses are sensors and speakers that
talk back. There are a lot of different sensors that can be installed to the house. These sensors can
measure temperature, moisture, and motion in the house. However, installing sensors to survey
a house is not the same thing as a smart house. When starting to build a smart house, the whole
environment has to be made smart. There should be an advisor who tells the user what is secure
and how the devices should be installed when designing this kind of house.
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When a new user starts designing a smart house, the first device that the user buys is normally
a smart television. The prices of smart televisions are lower than a couple years ago, and that is
one reason why more people decide to buy it nowadays. A smart television is similar to a normal
television, with an addition that there is a possibility to use the Internet via the television. A smart
television is like a smart phone with a bigger screen; the user can install applications, games or
streaming services on it. Many smart televisions already have a Netflix button included in the
remote controller. If the user wants to use these new technologies in the smart television, there
has to be an Internet connection. A connection can be made with an Ethernet cable or a wireless
technology. Even though the user can attach a smart television to the Internet, it is not a pure IoT
device.
When the user needs a wireless network for the devices, there has to be a router which has the
ability to support wireless technology. Usually, devices such as laptops, smartphones, and smart
televisions need a wireless connection. These devices, with other connected electronic devices,
form a LAN system to a smart home. There should be malware programs and antivirus programs
along with a secure password to secure these devices. Also, when the user has a possibility to
check updates from these devices, it is highly recommended to do it every month.
Another part of the smart house system is independent devices, for example temperature sen-
sors, alarm systems and motion sensors. These devices also need a control device which is con-
nected to the smart house router. The heating system can have sensors controlling the temperature
of the smart house and sensors in the water supply system alarm if there is a leak. The user can
attach a motor in a window shade and make it work automatically, and lights can be changed to
smart lights which can also be an automatic. There is also a smart lock system that can be attached
to the outdoor of a smart house and a smart wall plug which can be attached to a normal wall plug
system changing it to a remote-controlled system. The advantage in these smart wall plugs is that
when the user is away from home, he or she can check if there are any devices switched on and
switch them off remotely.
In a smart house system, the security is increased compared to a normal house. The user can
attach motion sensors to windows and outdoors. There is also a surveillance camera system which
the user can attach outside and inside of the house. The advantage of these security devices is
CHAPTER 4. THE CURRENT STATE OF IOT CYBER SECURITY 26
that the user can notice if there is an unwanted person on the yard, possibly trying to get inside
the house. The system can be modified to make an alarm to the police or to the firefighters if the
situation requires it.
When all these devices are connected to the main controlling system, the main infrastructure of
smart house architecture is in place. The user can attach more devices to the smart house system
afterwards. However, when doing this, it always has to be checked that every device installed
before, works without conflict with the new devices. When the whole system is built, the last
thing is to connect the smart house to the global Internet. The connection between the smart house
and the Internet should be made secure and if it is possible, it should be a VPN connection.
Figure 4.1: Sensitive information that an attacker could steal from an IoT device
CHAPTER 4. THE CURRENT STATE OF IOT CYBER SECURITY 27
4.2 Cyber attacks against IoT devices
Cyber attack is an attack that happens in the cyber network (see figure 4.1). The attack can shut
down the devices, make a denial-of-service (DoS) against the devices, the devices could be at-
tached as part of a botnet or the attack can be a man-in-the-middle attack (MITM). The purpose
of an MITM attack is to steal sensitive information from the network users. Attacks against IoT
devices have increased at the same time as the number of IoT devices has increased. The biggest
problem in IoT devices is the security of these devices. The manufacturers do not make them
very secure and the people who buy IoT devices do not understand information security enough
to demand better security from the manufacturers. Setting some standards for the manufacturers
has been under discussion in Finland, and in November 2019, the first manufacturer earned a cer-
tification mark for their smart devices. This new certification mark is based on the EN 303 645
standard and guarantees to the customer that the smart device is secure [37].
4.2.1 DoS and DDoS
DoS and Distributed DoS are one of the most used attack types [38, p. 304]. These are very easy
to execute and do not need a lot of resources. The main purpose of these attack types is to make
so much traffic to the network system that it crashes down. The attack can be made by a young
hacker who is testing his or her skills, by an activist group, by some country’s government, or it
can be a diversion and the real attack is happening somewhere else.
If the purpose of a DoS attack is to shut down a bank network or some other big company
network, there must be enough resources to do that. To make more resources for an attack, the
attacker normally spreads malwares to the public network and these malwares are waiting in the
devices for the attacker’s command. When the attacker has many devices infected, it is called a
Zombie army or a Botnet [39]. The reason for making a botnet is that an attacker wants more
units with which to make a connection to the target. If the attacker makes one request to the target,
it will not make any harm, but if the attacker makes 100 000 requests in the same millisecond it
probably makes the target server crash down.
Building a Botnet is based on infecting thousands of devices. Nowadays, when the number of
CHAPTER 4. THE CURRENT STATE OF IOT CYBER SECURITY 28
IoT devices has grown, there are smart refrigerators, routers and surveillance cameras which are
connected to the Internet. These new IoT devices are not protected enough and there are default
passwords and bad security standards in the devices. An attacker can use these devices to make
malwares spread faster and to a larger area. A malicious program stays hidden in a device and is
waiting for a launching command. When the botnet is large enough, it can be used to a DoS or
DDoS attack.
In 2016, one of the biggest DDoS attacks in history was launched. The Botnet, which was used
in the attack, was prepared for a long time and the attacker used a malicious program called Mirai
to do the attack. Mirai has been made to scan the network automatically and look for vulnerable
IoT devices. It uses a default password which the users have not changed when they bought the
device. When Mirai finds a vulnerable IoT device, it tries to connect with it, and if it successful
in connecting with a device, it infects it with a malicious program and attaches it to as part of a
botnet.[40]
4.2.2 MITM
An MITM attack is an attack type where an attacker makes an illegal connection between two
devices to eavesdrop traffic [38, p. 306]. The attack is based on the attacker hijacking traffic
between devices A and B. When the device A sends a message to the device B, the attacker hijacks
this message and reads it or modifies it before sending it to the device B. When the attacker sends
it to the device B, the attacker pretends to be the device A. Device B does not know that there has
happened anything and thinks that the message has come from the device A. These attacks can be
made using different technologies, for example Rogue Access Point (RAP), Address Resolution
Protocol (ARP), or Multicast domain names system (mDNS) [38, pp. 306-308].
RAP is a technology where an attacker needs a specific router to make a honeypot [38, p.
190]. A RAP device creates a WiFi network in the target area and waits for a random device to
connect to it. For example, if there is a public WiFi, like restaurant or bus station WiFi, it could
clone the network SSID and hide the real network. When the victim is looking for a WiFi network
with the victim device, there is a network that sounds familiar and safe. The victim connects to
the WiFi and thinks that it is a normal public WiFi. In reality, that is the attacker’s RAP device
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and it will connect the victim normally to the Internet, but at same time it will collect all data sent
and received by the victim. For example, usernames and passwords to different websites.
The attacker can use the ARP attack technology when he is already connected between two
devices. The ARP attack works in an Ethernet network. Every device connected to the Internet
has an IP address and a MAC address [38, pp. 306-308]. An IP address is the device‘s network
address in the Internet. A MAC address is the device’s own unique identifier; it consists of twelve
hexadecimal numbers which are divided to two groups of numbers. The first six numbers tell the
name of the manufacturer and the rest are unique number groups for network card address of that
particular device. When the device sends a request to the Internet, it makes an ARP-request. Every
device which is in the same LAN network with the device that sent the ARP request, sends its own
MAC address in response to the ARP request. When the first ARP request has been made and
the device which sent the request got an answer, it will be saved to that MAC address in the ARP
cache and then it does not have to make the ARP request again. If there is an attacker inside that
network, the attacker can hijack that ARP request and read it. After that the attacker can pretend
to be someone else and use it to send a false message to the network.
The mDNS spoofing attack is a similar type of attack than the DNS attack, but is working
inside LAN [38, p. 305]. It is very easy to be spoofing, because there is a security problem in the
mDNS protocol. The mDNS makes a multicast address query and sends it to clients. The clients
who listen this request send a name back to the questionnaire. If there is the same name twice, it
will take that name who responses first. So, if the user sends data to the IoT device inside LAN,
and the attacker machine inside LAN has already cloned the name of that device in an mDNS
query, then the data will go to the attacker’s device and not to the user own IoT device.
An MITM attack is a very popular attack when the attacker wants to steal sensitive information
from the victim. For example, there was an MITM attack against the VISA card company. The
attacker made an MITM attack between the users VISA card and a store payment terminal. When
the victim tried to make a payment with a VISA card, the attacker hijacked the card traffic and
sent a message to the payment terminal which confirms that contactless payment has already been
accepted from the card and at the same time it sends a message to the card that the payment
terminal does not need a contactless payment confirmation. The normal limit of VISA contactless
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payment in Finland is 50 euros, but after doing an MITM attack, the attacker can change the limit
to whatever he or she wants [41].
4.2.3 Software attacks
Software attacks is a third type of attack that can be used against IoT devices. This attack type in-
cludes, for example, malware, trojan, keylogger, remote control, and buffer overflow style attacks
[24, pp. 403-437]. These attacks can be done over the network with an Internet connection or
they can connect straight to an IoT device with WiFi or an Ethernet cable. The attacker can find
programs from the Internet which can be used to find open ports or to make a brute force attack
against the login screen. The attack type depends on the IoT device. If the IoT device has a web
interface, like a surveillance camera login screen, brute force might be one way to do it. But if it
is a local sensor which does not have a web interface or any other GUI, it is much harder to attack
against it and port scanning might give some info on what to do.
When the user wants to increase security in a smart house, he or she will probably buy a
surveillance system. Surveillance cameras are a very good way to see if there is are unwanted
people on the yard or inside the house. The problem is the vulnerabilities that these devices
almost always have. When the surveillance cameras are installed outside of the house and the
camera uses a wireless connection, it might be the weakest link of the smart house system. If the
attacker can pass the security of this camera and hijack its data traffic, the attacker can also make
a link via the camera to the router in the house. If this router has a weak security, the attacker can
break into the whole system. Normally, there is a windows pc or a mac computer that is connected
to the router, and if the attacker is able to penetrate to the security of the router, he or she has a
straight access to the computer. After the attacker has got an access to the computer, he or she can
easily install a backdoor to the computer which gives right to remote control that computer any
time the attacker wants [42].
When this kind of connection is made, the attacker has an unlimited access to the house com-
puter. The attacker could install a malware or a trojan to the computer and, depending on the
software code of the malicious program, it can do some damage to the computer, keeping some
ports open or just waiting start up commands from a botnet. The attacker can also install a key-
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logger to the computer with this malware program and every time the user uses the computer
and logins to some private website, the attacker gets all information that the user writes with the
keyboard.
A Buffer overflow attack is a technique where the attacker utilizes an unsecure code of a target
IoT device for an attack against that IoT device [24, p. 407]. If the attacker had information about
the target IoT device, the attacker could use this information to make a script which strains this
IoT device. The Buffer overflow technique is based on a program memory buffer overloading of
the target IoT device. When there is weak security in the program code and the attacker overloads
the memory part of the program, it can leak some data from the memory to the terminal. If the
attacker finds a right target, there might be some sensitive information which leaks to the attacker.
Another reason to do this attack is to disturb the target system. If the target system is a ventilation
system and the attacker stops it from working in the smart house, it can be irritating, or, if the
target is in the industry, a ventilation shutdown at a wrong time can result to large expenses, as
happened in the Stuxnet case against Iran Nuclear Facilities [43].
A smart lock system can be used on the outdoors of a smart house, which make using the
lock system much easier. A smart lock is an electronic lock which the user can control with a
smart phone application, RFID tags or pin code [44]. If the smart lock works with a smart phone
application, there has to be WiFi or Bluetooth technology inside the smart lock. With WiFi and
Bluetooth technologies, there is always the possibility of hacking and if this smart lock had a weak
security, it would be very easy to open without permission. There is a website in the Internet where
people teach how to hack a smart lock which has a wireless connection [45]. Another technology
a smart lock can use is RFID tags. RFID is more secure than a weak WiFi connection, but there
are cases where the attacker has successfully cloned an RFID tag and opened a smart lock [46].
The third technology is a pin code. Pin code is the most secure technology after the real physical
key, but there are still vulnerabilities, and if the programming code of a smart lock has a weak
security, there is a possibility to make a brute force attack or a buffer overflow attack against this
smart lock [47].
When the smart house architecture is designed well and every part of the system is protected
against physical and cyber attacks, the user gets very much comfort in having a smart house and
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does not have to fear that someone attacks on the property. However, only one part of the system
can be the weakest link and open the door to the attacker. Normally the attackers do not use only
one technique, rather, they will use multiple techniques when they want to find a weak point in the
system. Many of these techniques they are using, support each other. For example, when using
a DoS attack, the attacker can shut down the router and open some vulnerabilities. With these
vulnerabilities the attacker can install a malware, a backdoor or a keylogger, or the attacker can
use an MITM attack to first open an IoT device and then infect the whole system via that device.
4.3 Pentesting tools and platforms
There are three different kinds of hacker groups and they are commonly known as black hat, white
hat and grey hat hackers [48]. Cyber attacks are attacks against telecommunication systems in
companies or in the public sector or against private users. The attackers can be part of political
groups and they might have some political agenda they want to spread, they can be part of an
organized crime business and they want blackmail money or some other financial or personal
information, they can be part of a government agency and they are spying other nations, or, they
are just young amateurs who are testing their skills.
Cyber defence is the other side of the coin. People who work in this field are called white hat
hackers. They are also skilled computer users and their knowledge is similar to that of the black hat
hackers. The difference between a white hat and a black hat hacker is what they are doing with their
skills. White hat hackers are ethical hackers who are trying to defence telecommunication systems.
They are building new antivirus softwares, IDS, IPS and firewalls for the security sector [38, p.
70]. They can also try to compromise telecommunication system security with their penetration
testing skills, but there must be a permission to do this from the owner of the system. Companies
who sell penetration testing services to other companies are usually hiring white hack hackers.
The last group is called grey hat hackers. They are people from both sides; they are not cyber
criminals, but they are doing some questionable actions in the network system.
Both the attacker and the defender need good computer skills, but also good tools. For exam-
ple, if there is a locksmith and he has excellent skills, he still cannot do anything without tools.
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The same thing applies for hackers working in the area of telecommunication systems. Already,
there are many tools developed for this area, but a good hacker still has skills to make tools him-
or herself. The most used operation system in the area of penetration security is Kali Linux [49, p.
2]. Many tools, which the hacker needs to make a penetration test on the websites, against WiFi
security, scanning ports or just making phishing sites for testing purposes, are already installed to
the Kali Linux operating system. Moreover, there are many websites with online programs that
hackers can use for testing.
4.3.1 Kali Linux
The Kali Linux distribution is funded by the Offensive Security Ltd and founders of Kali Linux
are Mati Aharoni and Devon Kearns [50]. The user can install Kali Linux to the computer’s main
operating system, to the second operating system with dual boot ability, or, it can be used directly
from a CD-ROM or a USB stick. Kali Linux supports many penetration testing tools developed
and it is very easy to install new tools to it. Kali Linux also supports most of the WiFi adapters
and Bluetooth adapters in the market.
The Kali Linux distribution includes tools for information gathering, vulnerability analysis,
wireless attacks, application testing, exploitation, making stress testing, and it also has forensics
tools. These tools are made for finding vulnerabilities from websites and softwares. Many of the
IoT devices are using wireless technology and when a device is using wireless technology there is
always the possibility that someone tries to hack it.
4.3.2 Burp Suite
The Burp Suite is a special software for penetration testing. The users can use it for monitoring,
modifying and stopping Internet traffic from the user’s computer. It is a particular kind of MITM
proxy, including special tools that can be used for attacking websites. There are three different
versions of Burp Suite: free community version, a Professional Edition and an Enterprise Edition
[51]. The free community version has the basic tools for penetration testing. The Enterprise
Edition has a Web vulnerability scanner and Scheduled and repeat scanners in addition to the
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basic tools. The Professional version has a Web Vulnerability scanner and advanced tools for
penetration testing. In November 2019, the price for the Enterprise Edition was 3499 euros per
year and for the Professional Edition the price was 349 euros per year. The community version is
free of charge [51].
Figure 4.2: Firefox proxy settings
The first thing when starting to use Burp Suite, is to setup a proxy in the browser’s settings.
The proxy address is normally setup to localhost 127.0.0.1 and the port to where it is connected
can be 8080 (see figure 4.2). These settings allow the Burp Suite software to read data traffic
between the browser and the Internet. There is an ability to stop traffic, repeat it and modify it
Figure 4.3: Parameters in Burpsuite
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before sending. For example, when the browser gets the login page from the Internet and there
are username and password textboxes, the user can send a fake username and password back to
the server with the Burp Suite software. Then, when the server answers to the user, there can be a
plaintext or an encoded answer from the server whether the authentication is correct or not. If the
message is not encrypted well enough, the user can open it and change it before it arrives and get
an access to the site without permission.
The Burp Suite software can also be used to make a brute force attack against the login pages
of websites. When the user has already stopped traffic between the browser and the server (see
figure 4.3), the user can send this HTML page to the repeater tool. With the repeater the user can
change the username and password in the textboxes and repeat the send command after this. If
the user has a password library which is large enough, he or she can use intruder tools in the Burp
Suite and test all of these passwords automatically. The problem in this method is that it will take
a lot of resources and time to crack the password via the brute force attack. If the password is
made according to good password standards, it will take several years to solve it.
One of the useful tools in the Burp Suite software is a decoder (see figure 4.4). The user
can copy part of the encoded text and send it to the decoder. The decoder has eight different
encoding/decoding methods that the user can use to encode/decode a text. With spider tool the
user can check what kind of different folders there are in a website folder tree, which makes
Figure 4.4: Decoder
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attacking to a website much easier. Furthermore, it is possible to check open ports from a website
by using an intruder tool, which works like an NMAP tool. This software is very useful against
IoT devices if an IoT device has a web interface.
4.3.3 WireShark
WireShark is a software which is made for monitoring and analysing Internet traffic [52]. It is an
open source software founded in 1998 [52]. WireShark is based on the same technique than the
Tcpdump software, but a graphical interface has been added for easier use. With the WireShark
software the user can monitor Internet traffic and save data to a PCAP file. After WireShark
version 1.4, an ability to monitor a wireless network has been included in WireShark [52]. To
monitor a wireless network, the user has to change his or her wireless adapter to the monitoring
mode before starting the WireShark monitoring. With this ability it is also possible to monitor the
network traffic of an IoT device if the IoT device has a wireless connection.
The amount of data is huge when using the WireShark packet capture tool. When the user
wants to read data from the packet, it will be a very painful task. Luckily, there is a filtering tool
to make it easier. The WireShark filtering tool includes many different filters, for example an IP
address filter, a protocol filter and a port filter. With the IP filter the user can filter either the source
or the destination address. With the protocol filter, the user can choose for example HTTP, TCP or
UDP protocol (see figure 4.5). If there is not good encryption or not encryption at all in the data,
the attacker can use that and read the user’s username and password easily from the data.
4.3.4 Shodan
Shodan is the most dangerous search engine in the Internet [53]. Every device connected to the
Internet can be found with Shodan. With Shodan, an attacker can search open and unprotected
ports from the Internet. Registration is not necessary if someone wants to start using Shodan.
However, if the user wants to use all abilities in the Shodan webpage, registering is required.
Because of the abilities Shodan includes, it can be used to penetration testing purposes. How-
ever, it can also be used as a very advanced attacking tool. The user only has to put a search word
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Figure 4.5: WireShark network analyser
to the Shodan filter and Shodan searches it from the Internet. The search retrieves all words which
include that word in the device’s name. For example, if the word ‘camera’ is used as the search
word, Shodan searches all devices including the word ‘camera’ in their name. When it finds a
device which includes the word ‘camera’ in its name, it searches for an open port in this device
and lists it to the person who made the search. Now this person can check whether these ports have
passwords or other authentication methods. Without security the ports can be penetrated, and the
attacker can use the interface of these devices to his or her own purposes. Many devices have an
ability to install firmware updates via Internet. If the attacker manages to install a new firmware
update to a device, the attacker can join the device to his or her bot network with this update.
Chapter 5
Designing smart home system
architecture
The purpose of this thesis is to develop a virtual penetration testing environment for IoT devices.
This environment can be used to test whether the connected IoT devices have cyber security prob-
lems or vulnerabilities by using penetration testing tools. This chapter focuses on the architecture
of smart home IoT systems in order to offer a general view of the multifacetedness of a smart home
environment and the network technologies used normally in smart homes. First, the focus is on the
router, which is the centre device of a smart home system. The router is also an interface between
the Internet and the LAN. The second important device of a smart home is a controller. The main
purpose of a controller is being the control panel of all the devices in a smart home. Finally, this
chapter examines the most used smart devices in smart homes, for example smart lights, smart
locks, smart sensors and surveillance cameras.
5.1 Router
The first aspect of choosing a router to a smart home system architecture is to consider how many
different network technologies is included in the new smart home system. Basic home computers
are normally connected to the environment with an Ethernet cable, but other devices, for example
smart sensors or smart lights, might need a wireless technology with which to connect to the router.
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Normally families have also tablet computers, laptop computers and smart phones; these are all
devices which probably need a wireless connectivity, as tablets and smart phones do not even have
an integrated Ethernet port.
The second aspect is usability: when choosing a router to a smart home system, there has to
be a good user interface, so it is easy to learn how to use it. Moreover, almost everyone who use a
smart home system is not very interested in the technical details of the system. If the router has an
ability to connect to a smart phone application, it will give more usability to the user and the user
has a possibility to remote control the system when the user is not at home [54]. There is also a
possibility to use a web-based user interface, but that cannot be recommended to anyone. The web-
based user interface is much more unsecure than smart phone applications and an unauthorized
person could break into the user interface via Ethernet more easily [54].
The third aspect of choosing a router is the range of the area that the router has to cover. There
is a big difference in wireless technology if the apartment where the smart home system is located
is 40 square meters or 200 square meters. If the wireless technology of the router does not cover
the whole apartment, there are devices that can be used to strengthen the wireless signal. The
prices of these devices start from 20 euros, and the strength of the signal could be increased by 30
to 50 percent. Another alternative is to use the Wireless mesh network (WMN) [55]. The WMN
consists of two or more routers which are connected to each other. Together these routers construct
a larger connected network area. The WMN helps the user to move inside an apartment without
losing the network connection.
The main purpose of the router is to control the network traffic of a smart home system. It is
a firewall between the global Internet and the local area network (LAN) at home. When installing
a new router to a smart home system, the user should check the router’s firewall configuration,
because there can be some rules that the user wants to change. Furthermore, it is highly recom-
mendable to check the wireless network settings of the router before connecting it to the global
Internet and change the default password on the router interface and the wireless network if there
is too weak a password.
CHAPTER 5. DESIGNING SMART HOME SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE 40
5.2 Controller
A controller is a device where the interfaces of all other devices should be connected in a smart
home system. If the controller needs a graphical user interface (GUI), it can be a tablet which is
attached, for example, to wall at home, or it can be a smart phone application. The router has to
have an ability to control the devices if the controller is a smart phone application. Still, if the
router has an ability to control the network traffic of the devices, the main user interface of the
devices is in the application and the data stream goes from the application via router to the end
devices and from there back to the application. When building a new apartment and there are
plans to make it a smart home, it is wise to put the Ethernet cable inside a wall and connect it
to the tablet version of the controller. It is more secure than using a wireless mobile application
because, as always with wireless technology, there is a possibility that someone makes an MITM
attack between the devices and the application.
Sometimes there is a controller without a GUI. In this case, there has to be some other way to
control the devices. Voice-controlled smart devices have been developed by different manufactur-
ers. For example, Apple’s device is called Siri, Google has created its own version called Google
Assistant and Amazon has a voice controlled speaker called Alexa. Amazon was, however, the
first manufacturer who produced a voice-controlled smart speaker for private customers. Alexa
starts to work when the user gives the command “Alexa” after which the user commands what
Alexa should do [56]. For example, the user can give the following command: “Alexa, what is
the temperature outside”. Alexa is connected to the Amazon server via Internet and starts looking
for an answer from there. After Alexa has found an answer to the user’s question, it tells it to the
user with a voice that the user has installed to Alexa’s program beforehand. Another example is
controlling the devices in a smart home environment. When the user gives a command like “Alexa
start coffee machine”, it starts a conversation with the coffee machine and tells the user what he
or she should do next [56]. There is a security risk in voice-controlled devices. If the data that
these devices collect from the user’s home stayed in LAN, there would not be problems such as
data leakage. But, for example, Alexa always sends all the data that it gathers from the user’s
home to the Amazon’s server. How can we be sure that Amazon does not sell this data to various
enterprises?
CHAPTER 5. DESIGNING SMART HOME SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE 41
The security of the controller is the most important part of the smart home architecture. The
reason why the controller is such a security risk, is that it is the centre of the smart home system.
All data traffic that is being transferred inside LAN goes through the controller components. The
login authentication information of the controller has to be secured well enough. When the user
buys a new controlling device, changing the password from the controller settings should be the
first thing to do. Usually, there is no need to install a web-based interface to the controller. But, if
there is no other way to configure the controller settings, a web-based interface has to be installed.
In this case, the user should make a localhost or setup a VPN tunnel between the controller and
the interface to ensure security and to avoid the possibility of an MITM attack.
5.3 Smart lights
The first smart device bought is usually smart lights. Normally, the user has a smart television
before smart lights, but a smart television is a connected device, not an IoT device. Therefore,
it is more like a computer connected to the Internet. The number of different smart lights is
increasing on the market. Most of these smart lights need a low range wireless technology. For
example, Ikea’s Trådfri smart lights use a ZigBee technology between the smart bulb and the
remote controller [57, p. 6]. This technology is very simple, as the user only has to change a bulb
and connect the controller and the bulb together. There is also a mobile phone application, which
the user can use to control the light bulbs [57, p. 14]. When using this application, the user has
to buy a gateway that is developed for the Trådfri lights. This gateway needs to be connected with
WLAN technology to the smart home controller.
Information transfer between the gateway and smart light bulbs are using similar technology
than the information transfer between smart light bulbs and the remote controller. This technology
has good information security and it is not a reasonable target to attack. The gateway is connected
with WLAN technique to the controller and this is one part of LAN network traffic. If the user
does not have good security in his or her LAN, there is a possibility to make an MITM attack to
information traffic occurring between the controller and the gateway. An attack to the smart lights
is not a big expense to the user, but it can be very irritating if someone blinks the user’s lights
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without permission.
5.4 Smart lock
A smart lock is a lock which can be attached to the outdoor of a smart house. It can be remote
controlled or a normal, physically controlled lock. The number of users of smart locks is increasing
nowadays because the security of smart locks has improved lately. Some locks are working with
an RFID tag, some with a remote-control application and some locks have a normal physical panel.
Those locks that are using a remote-control application, has to have wireless technology installed.
This remote-control application working with a mobile phone can be a security risk.
Vulnerabilities of smart locks can be scanned with special tools if there is WiFi on. There
is a possibility to increase the security of WiFi. Users should use a strong enough password and
the encryption technology should be at least WPA2. If there is WPS technology, it should be
turned off. The WPA2 encryption technology is not enough if there is a weak password. The user
should change the password if it is a factory password and check other settings as well. There is a
possibility that someone makes an MITM attack to traffic data between the phone and the lock and
gets the authentication data from there. When the attacker makes an MITM attack to a smart lock,
the attacker can save that data to a PCAP file and use that to decrypt the password from the data.
If there was good security and the encryption technology was updated, it would be much harder.
5.5 Smart sensors
Smart sensors are a hidden part of the smart home architecture. The smart sensors can be used
to control the heating system and air ventilation at home, detect fire gas or create an alarm if an
unauthorized person is moving in the house [58]. The sensor itself does not have to be smart, but
when the user puts many sensors in the house, the sensor network can collect information data
from the house and steer this data to the user’s control panel. With this information the user can be
wiser than without it and this is part of the smart house content. For example, the user can collect
data from the heating system and use that to control all heating radiators in the house. There can
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be, for example, a different heating temperature in the bedroom than in the living room. Also,
with the controller the user can automatically adjust the temperature of the room to be lower in the
morning if the user so wishes. When the user is not at home, the temperature can be slightly lower
which is one way to save money in heating costs.
The motion detection sensors have been used many years in people’s houses to turn on the
outdoor lights, but motion detection sensors in an IoT environment are a new thing. A motion
detection sensor can be attached to the outdoor or window of a house and connected to the user’s
phone application. This is useful when the user is not at home and wants to check that everything
is in order in the house. When there is a senior housing community, a motion detection sensor can
be attached to the gateway of the smart home system and this gateway can send an alarm to the
authorities if there has happened an accident. Another place where the user can use the sensors is
in the water supply system. The sensors can monitor that there are no leaks or any other kinds of
problems in the water supply system. If a problem occurs, an alarm can be sent to the user. It can
save a lot of money if the water damage can be reduced with this warning system.
5.6 Surveillance camera
The smart house architecture which includes a surveillance system could have several outdoor and
indoor cameras or only one surveillance camera on the front yard. If the user is not at home, he
or she can easily follow what happens inside the house using a phone application. For example,
if there is a pet alone at home, the user can check that everything is alright, or if the user is going
on a holiday and the house is left empty, he or she can keep an eye on the house remotely and
have peace of mind. Indoor and outdoor cameras installed to the part of the surveillance system.
If the user cannot attach a camera to the system with an Ethernet cable, it has to be attached with
wireless technology. When a camera is using wireless technology to send data to the smart house
system, there is always a possibility to an MITM attack.
If a surveillance camera uses a wireless technology and is installed outside of the house, the
surveillance camera can be the weakest link of the smart house architecture. When a camera is
on the outside of a smart house, there is a possibility that some unauthorized person examines the
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model and technology of the camera. When the attacker knows the camera’s model, he or she can
do more research on the Internet and find a possible vulnerability concerning that particular model.
For this purpose, there are programs on the Internet, for example Shodan, which was introduced
in more detail in section 4.3.4.
When designing a new smart house architecture, it is important to make a route for an Ethernet
cable in the surveillance system. If the surveillance camera is connected to LAN in the smart
house, the user is supposed to turn off the wireless technology in the surveillance camera. If there
is no possibility to attach the new camera to LAN, it has to be part of the wireless system. When
the camera is in a wireless network, it is important to check the camera’s settings and make sure
there is secure configuration. A more secure way is making another isolated LAN and install the
surveillance camera to that LAN. It might cause problems if the camera is installed on the outside
wall of a house, for example on the front wall of a house to monitor movement on the front yard.
When the camera is installed in the house’s LAN system, a new wired connection can easily be
connected to this device from outside of the house and get access to the house’s LAN network if it
is not isolated to a separate LAN system. When doing these kinds of different networks inside the
house, there is an important question which needs to be considered: what is the balance between
usability and security?
Chapter 6
Designing and building a virtual smart
home IoT environment for penetration
testing education
In this chapter is presented the architecture of the virtual penetration testing environment de-
veloped in this study. VMWare virtualization program was used for virtualising the penetration
testing environment. This system simulates a simple smart home environment which includes a
router equipped with a firewall, a home computer and two IoT devices (see figure 6.1). An old
Windows XP system was chosen for the home computer because its vulnerabilities are already
commonly known. To be able to use these vulnerabilities in this thesis, the vulnerabilities must be
already published, and their patches must be publicly available.
The router chosen for this study is the PfSense virtual router. It was chosen because it is easy
to configure, and its firewall is easy to validate appropriately. A router is used to create LAN
(Local Area Network) and WAN (Wide Area Network) addresses, to which other virtual machines
in the system have been attached with static IP addresses. To the router in the WAN side, the router
gives one IP address and open ports for different protocols. Internal traffic of the smart home is
connected to the router in the LAN side, and also new IoT devices can be easily connected to it
when developing the simulation further. A connection to the simulation can also be opened via a
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real physical router, to which existing IoT devices can be attached for testing purposes. This is,
however, beyond the scope of this thesis, because it is used in demonstrating the functioning of a
network, but it is not necessary for research and teaching purposes. The virtual machines installed
Figure 6.1: Virtual penetration testing environment architecture
in the environment are supposed to reflect IoT devices that communicate through the router. The
environment is easy to modify to resemble for example Raspberry Pi device, which is commonly
used in IoT devices. The whole environment has been set to function with VmWARE virtual ESX
server, which has been installed to the university server machines. VmWARE was chosen for the
environment partly because of its support services, but also partly because the university already
had this system. The system is meant to be used in teaching purposes in the future, so keeping it
in the university’s own network is thus reasonable.
6.1 VmWARE
The simulator has been built to the ESX server produced by VMware. The ESX server is an
independent virtual software, in which one can drive several different virtual machines at the same
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time. Users can be added to the server and users’ rights can be governed as desired. By using the
ESX server environment, a closed internal network can be built, into which a sufficient number of
machines and devices can be connected. For each individual user can be classified a set of rights
regarding which virtual machines they have the right to use in the Internet.
Firstly, an own network is created in the environment, and the virtual machines are linked to
it. The building of the network begins from its core; therefore, a router is needed. With the router,
separate WAN and LAN networks are created in the network, so that it is possible to simulate
an environment which resembles a smart home. When the environment is ready, the network
in question can be cloned and copied to a requisite number of students. For example, if there
are 20 students in a course and it is desired that hands-on-exercises are used in teaching, these
students can be divided into groups of two and each group gets a network environment for their
use. Next, the student gets a username for VSphere and when registering to the network with a
given username and password, the student or group sees only that virtual machine which is meant
for them.
PfSense is a virtual router and a firewall which is based on an open source code. It can be
installed to function as its own firewall and transfer all the network traffic of the machine through
that particular firewall. It can also be installed to function as a router, which is the main purpose
of this study. In this study, PfSense has been installed in one virtual machine and it has been given
two network cards to function. The other network card can be used to create an outward bound
WAN network, wanted to reflect the open world of the Internet.
PfSense can be used to create IP addresses either automatically or manually. A network
10.0.0.0, which is a simulation of an outside Internet, has been created in this study. The attacking
machine used in this study is connected to the address 10.0.0.5 in this network. For safety reasons,
the network is otherwise closed from outside network traffic. This WAN network would also be
possible to connect directly to the right server, but the purpose of this study is to create a safe,
simulated testing environment, and therefore it is unnecessary at this stage. The inner network
which models the smart house has been created with the other network card of the PfSense router.
A LAN network of 25 addresses has been created with the network card. The address of the inner
network is 192.168.10.1/24; the /24 at the end of the IP address means that the IP address has a
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Figure 6.2: PfSense dashboard
DHCP server and it divides the network into 25 parts. When a new device is connected to the LAN
network it gets its own subnetwork directly from the DHCP server, for example 192.168.10.2. If
desired, the size of the network can be easily increased by giving more addresses to the network,
but 25 subnetwork addresses is an adequate number due to the number of devices in the study.
The settings of the network are made from the terminal after installing PfSense. However, if
more exact firewall settings and rules are needed, it is easier to do that via web interface, as long
as the presettings have been made from the terminal. In order to be able to modify the settings
from the web interface, a virtual machine with an existing operating system must be connected to
the network. With the installed server of the operating system signing directly into the server’s
web interface is possible. It is good to have a proper JavaScript support in the operating system
as it makes scrolling the web interface more user-friendly. When a connection has been made
with the web interface, new rules and other firewall settings can be set to PfSense from there.
Figure 6.2 presents the front page of the PfSense web interface. From this particular page can be
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seen how the router has divided the WAN and LAN sides to separate networks. Figure 6.3 shows
the firewall settings in the WAN side. When the firewall is switched on, the WAN side of the
PfSense ruletable is empty with default settings. Therefore, all traffic from outside the network is
automatically blocked. By writing certain rules, the attacking machine is given the possibility to
connect to the network.
Figure 6.3: Firewall WAN tablerules
Normally, the rules of the WAN side should be written as strictly as possible so that only the
needed traffic can get through the firewall to the inner network. In this study, however, the rules
have been written very loosely, so that a penetration exercise to the network can be done. In the
rules, ports 80 (HTTP) are opened, enabling also penetrating into PfSense web interface. Port 443
(HTTPS) opens the connection for a better protected version in the web interface, port 445 (MS
DS) is opened, so that the vulnerability of Windows XP computer can be utilised to get a remote
control access to the target machine. Furthermore, port 22 (SSH) also needs to be opened from
the firewall, so that a connection can be made with the SmartLock programme in the network.
Kali Linux system was chosen for the attacking machine due its tools and properties that fit for
penetration testing. These tools and their properties were presented in section 4.3.1 Kali Linux is
also the most used Linux distribution package by cyber security criminals, so in that sense it is also
a good fit for the attacker’s tool Windows XP (experience) is a Windows distribution published
by Microsoft in 2001. The first versions of XP were the Home edition and Professional, followed
by SP updates (Service Pack): SP1 versions in 2002, SP2 in 2004 and SP3 in 2008. The version
used in this thesis is Windows XP SP3 because it is the newest member of the XP family and
still widely used in computers, both in factories and in home computers. Microsoft ended the XP
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distribution support in 2015, after which Microsoft has recommended that everyone should use
newer versions of Windows.
6.2 IoT devices
Several vulnerabilities to which Windows has published a patch package have been found from
the Windows XP SP3 distribution. These patch packages, however, must be downloaded to the
computer by the user him- or herself, and often the user has not done this. That is why it is still
possible to use already found vulnerabilities to attacking purposes. In this thesis, one vulnerability
detected in Windows XP SP3 has been used. This vulnerability enables making a remote control
connection without any action required from the user. In this thesis, penetrating to the Windows
XP target machine is even easier. After installation its firewall has been switched off and port 445
(MS DS) has been opened, originally meant for the port of the remote-controlled printer. Port 445
has also been detected to be a passage of well-known ransomwares, such as WannaCry and Petya,
to the target machine, so this is a suitable vulnerability for an exercise [59].
The aim is to do a so-called general model so that needed devices can later be easily added to
the simulation. First, a virtual machine is created, and to this machine is given a needed amount
of memory, processor capacity (CPU) and hard drive space for use. The resources of the device
are determined by the needs of the IoT device. The device is connected directly to the simulated
network with a network card and it seeks itself a DHCP (Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol)
address distributed by PfSense. The necessary ports are opened from the device so that devices
operating with different interfaces can be created. The virtual machine requires some kind of
operating system. The operating system is installed to the computer with an ISO file using a
virtual station. In the devices used in this study, Ubuntu 16.04.2 server ISO icon has been used to
install the operating system into the virtual machine. In this study, two separate virtual machines
have been installed and both drive Ubuntu Server Linux as the operating system.
First, a working network interface is given to the virtual machine so that updates to the op-
erating system can be done and the system can be otherwise altered as required. Logging in
resulting from rebooting the computer has been deleted by creating a new service in the file
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/etc/systemd/system/getty@tty1.service.d/override.conf, with changes shown in figure 6.4. When
the necessary changes have been done in the virtual machine, the network card can be changed
back to a closed environment from the settings of the virtual machine.
Figure 6.4: Override.conf file modifying
6.2.1 Smart lock
The first IoT device in this study is a smart lock control panel written in C++. The software has
been installed directly to the root of Linux. The Linux system has been configured so that when
it is switched on, it starts the software directly with a BASH script. In addition, port 22 has been
opened for SSH connection and protection measures have been removed to make the task easier.
Normally, there is not a graphic user interface (GUI) in the most common models of smart
locks, therefore, controlling of this software is also done from the terminal. The programme gives
the user a menu when it opens, as seen in figure 6.5. The purpose of this menu is to demonstrate
buttons in a real smart lock. A list of users can be read from the device’s panel and a certain
number of users can be added to the device. The number of users is limited in the programming
code of the device. The third option of the device is to “Open door”. To open the lock in the door
the user must be an authorised user on the list.
However, an error has happened in the device when programming and it is not possible to
define rights for the user by clicking “add user”. Thus, opening the door requires the rights of a
“Master” user at the moment. In this particular device the task is to find out whether it is possible
to open the lock without having to disassemble the device. Solving this exercise requires knowhow
about the C++ programming language and understanding of Buffer overflow errors in the use of
IoT devices.
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Figure 6.5: Smart lock system control panel
Several smart devices operate in the Internet and if there have been errors in the cyber security
of the devices already in the programming stage, it is very difficult for the user to patch these
errors independently. Furthermore, when the device has been installed in the network at home, it
is possible that redundant ports have been left open in the device, for which reason the operating of
the device can possibly be disturbed or fully penetrated. Smart locks must have some kind of user
interface for it to function properly. The manufacturers should pay more attention specifically to
this aspect so that the functioning of the lock cannot be manipulated by outsiders. A publication in
the TechCrunch site demonstrates how easily a badly designed smart lock can be penetrated [60].
6.2.2 Surveillance camera interface
The other IoT device used in this study is a web interface of a surveillance camera installed at
home. The interface of the camera has been done using the programming language React.JS and
the ready application of the software has been installed to a virtual machine with Ubuntu server
Linux as the operating system. The virtual machine has been configurated so that when it is
switched on, it drives a BASH script, which first opens its own server to run in a certain port for
the use of the application. After this, the application is switched on in the script, and then the
application connects to a server which is already switched on and opens a graphic user interface to
an IP address. For the functioning of the application, port 80 must be opened from the system for
HTTP connection. In this study, port 80, which is the port of the HTTP protocol, is used because
the benefit of the exercise does not increase even though a better protected connection was used,
such as port 443, which is the port of the HTTPS protocol.
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The interface of the device is opened to port 80 (HTTP) and its protection has been left to
default values. The task is to understand the importance of password protection and that many
device manufacturers leave the protection to default values; standard passwords and usernames are
easily found from the Internet. The user has been given a BASE64 encoded file, which contains
a set of usernames, and another BASE64 encoded file, which contains a set of passwords. These
usernames are simple and very common, and manufacturers may use them as standard in their
devices. The user must be able to master tools in BurpSuite programme, so that it is possible to
penetrate through the protection of the surveillance camera to the interface of the device.
Surveilllance cameras are one of the most popular targets when wanting to penetrate into
the network of a smart home. Typically, the cameras are placed outside of the house, for which
reason an outsider can easily recognize the brand and model of the camera in question. When
the attacker knows the brand and model, it is possible to prepare the attack carefully by searching
detected vulnerabilities from the Internet related to that particular camera. Often cameras also
have some kind of web interface with which to make settings to the camera or download data from
the camera’s memory. If the protection of a smart home network is jeopardised, the camera can
be penetrated from inside the network as well, and if the passwords of the camera’s web interface
are too weak or if the camera’s interface has other vulnerabilities, they can be used in this kind of
situation. For penetrating the security of a camera, one possible option is to use the Shodan search
engine, which is covered more fully in section 4.3.4.
Chapter 7
Conclusion
In this thesis, the safety of IoT devices is examined and a virtual penetration testing environment
is built for testing cyber security of these devices. The environment built in this study are also
going to be used in educating new cyber security students for better understanding of the basics
of penetration testing and for teaching them the meaning of penetration testing in cyber security
related work. The testing environment in this study is intended to resemble the basic architecture of
a smart home system. The attacking machine used in the environment was Kali Linux penetration
testing operation system and the router and firewall was PfSense virtual firewall. The attacking
machine was installed to its outer network (WAN) and target machines to its inner network (LAN).
The desktop computer of the smart home user was Windows XP SP3 version system, because its
vulnerabilities are already generally known and this way the cyber security of softwares of third
parties was not endangered during research. The IoT models used in the laboratory work with
Linux Ubuntu operating system. A surveillance camera system, with its interface opened for the
attack target, and a Smart Lock system which has a control panel in the device’s IP address and
includes a CTF exercise, were chosen for the IoT devices.
The environment built in this study can be utilised for education purposes if more exercises
are added. This environment cannot be used as a virtual testing system for IoT devices as such,
but physical IoT devices can, however, be installed in the environment and their testing is possible
with the environment in question. The biggest challenge was to get the IoT devices virtualised
when building the virtual penetration testing environment for testing of IoT devices. Already
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virtualised IoT devices were very hard to come by and coding them from the start by myself is
out of the scope of this thesis. Therefore, it was decided to examine how to install real physical
devices in the environment. Attaching physical devices in a virtual testing environment is the
best way to test the cyber security of IoT devices. If it is desired that the environment is used as
teaching material, much more exercises needs to be added to it. Doing these exercises in the scope
of this thesis would be too extensive, as the exercises need to be done manually from the start.
Although, already completed CTF competitions could be utilised and ways which would speed up
the process of doing the environment exercises could be sought.
In the future, the laboratory in question could be extended to apply also to WEP penetration
testing and certain physical IoT devices could be attached in the laboratory, in addition to the
virtual device photos. Also, newer operating systems than Windows XP and other penetration
devices could be attached in the laboratory. When the foundation of the laboratory is done, it is
easy to add exercises in it and set them to work with new virtual machines. If needed, power can
be added to the machines and 255 devices can be installed to merely PfSense LAN side without
any changes.
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